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Abstract:
I became responsible for developing the market for computers in Eastern and Central Europe during the early days of
the expansion of the computer industry in 1963 until 1974. In this paper, I describe LEO’s successful entry into that
market to take what I believe to have been a leading position during my period as export manager. We primarily
achieved this position due to LEO’s achieving a deep understanding of the special features driving this market during
the Cold War, which enabled LEO to meet the market’s needs more successfully.
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LEO in East Europe 1963-1974

Backstory

In November 1951, J. Lyons Co Ltd, one of Britain’s foremost food and restaurant businesses (Bird,
2000), announced and demonstrated the world’s first commercial computer application running on an inhouse computer called LEO: Lyons Electronic Office. LEO was in many respects an unexpected success.
Interest in the project by industry and commerce persuaded Lyons to set up a subsidiary company, LEO
Computers Limited, to make and sell computers for business and government use. Following this
announcement, many of Britain’s major industrial and commercial companies together with several
government departments purchased LEO computers.
LEO 1 was a first-generation electronic digital computer that used valves, had a 2000-word store based
on mercury delay lines, and linked directly to a variety of input and output devices. Its operating software
was limited, and programming relied on an assembly language intercode. Only one LEO 1 was
constructed and used both for Lyons own data processing and as a bureau service. LEO 1 was followed
in the mid-1950s by LEO 2, which was much faster and had a larger store. The later LEO 2s had
increased speeds largely due to transistors’ replacing valves and core storage’s replacing the mercury
delay lines (Bird, 1994, page 257). In total, 11 LEO 2s were built (Bird, 1994, p. 234) In turn. LEO 2s were
replaced in the early 1960s by the LEO 3 range comprising the upward-compatible LEO 3, LEO 360, and
LEO 326. The LEO 3 range were third-generation computers with multitasking capabilities, a sophisticated
operating system, the master routine, and a high-level “business” language CLEO (comparable to
COBOL).
In 1963, Lyons decided to sell its computer company to another major British multinational company. Also,
English Electric developed the Marconi family of Computers; hence, the company became English Electric
LEO Marconi (EELM). The combined company established a new range System 4, which it intended to be
IBM 360 compatible. Later mergers of all the U.K. computer makers established International Computers
Limited (ICL), which sold both the LEO System 4 series and the former ICT 1900 series until the 2900
range of computers replaced both.
Researchers have thoroughly documented LEO’s story (Bird, 1994; Caminer, Aris, Hermon, & Land, 1997;
Ferry, 2003; Land, 2012)1. LEO is now widely recognized as the world’s first commercial digital computer.
Its technical achievements and especially its application experience are well known, as are its subsequent
failure to counter the strength of competitors, primarily IBM, which led to attempts to consolidate the
British computer industry through a series of mergers. The English Electric Computer Division, which had
already incorporated Elliot Automation, merged with LEO to form English Electric LEO Marconi (EELM).
And, some years later, under strong government pressure, a hoped-for British winner emerged from
International Computer Technology’s (ICT) merging with EELM to form International Computers Ltd (ICL).

2

LEO in Eastern Europe

Less well known is the story of LEO in the Soviet Union and the nations of East and Central Europe,
which comprised the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact countries (known as COMECON), and Yugoslavia
(which stayed independent of this grouping). The region’s market differed from the West’s, which created
a series of exceptional problems and opportunities. Success depended on taking advantage of the
opportunities and finding ways to overcome the problems In 1964, on the basis that I could speak
German, LEO’s then Managing Director, T. R. Thompson, asked me to take on the role of export manager
for a company that had virtually no export business outside the successful LEO companies in South Africa
and Australia. However, I had the good fortune to have attached to me Daniel Broido, then Chief
Mechanical Engineer of LEO.
Broido had been a refugee from Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. He first moved to
Germany, where he completed his technical education, and came to London in the 1930s. He worked with
several companies on document reading before Lyons and LEO recruited him in 1954. Broido was a

1

The LEO Computers Society website includes a comprehensive bibliography of material about LEO: see http://www.leocomputers.org.uk/images/Comp-biblio-240115.pdf
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pioneer in mark-sensing , which led to the design and development of the Lector Document Reader and,
subsequently, the Autolector, the online version.
In Russia, Broido’s father had been a leading Menshevik, a moderate left-wing party that had led the
revolution, which Lenin and the Bolsheviks subsequently overthrew. Nevertheless, Broido had kept
himself well connected in the Soviet Union and with several of the Russian satellite countries.
Broido had always believed that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact counties provided a unique
opportunity for LEO. He had already demonstrated as much by introducing LEO to potential customers in
Czechoslovakia where the National Railways and the Ministry of Social Security (and, subsequently,
major steelworks in Ostrava: Nova Huta Clementa Gotwald) had duly purchased large LEO 3 systems.
The decision then to concentrate our non-Commonwealth exports, initially, on the ‘soft underbelly’ of the
European Market was self-evident and proved to be a remarkable success.

3

Background: the Market

The East and Central European market comprised COMECON (the Soviet Union and its satellite nations,
the DDR (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, plus Tito’s Yugoslavia, and
Albania). During the Cold War, trade with those countries was limited and restricted for two main reasons.
In part, COMECON countries were self-isolated from the West and focused on a determination to trade in
the bloc to achieve economic self-sufficiency, (Kaser, 1967; Zwass, 1989; Cortada, 2008). Perhaps more
important was the Cold War, which led the Western powers to impose a strategic embargo on the supply
to the Soviet Bloc of military equipment and dual use equipment (e.g., computers that could be used for
either civilian or military applications). The Coordinating Committee of NATO (COCOM) enforced the
Strategic Embargo (Mastanduno, 1992). The Soviet Bloc countries, in consequence of these policies,
found it difficult to keep up with global developments in technology and were chronically short of
convertible foreign exchange.
Although theoretical work on computing had been highly developed in academic projects, computer
design, manufacture, and usage increasingly lagged behind that of the West (Hally, 2003; Malinovski,
2006). By the 60s, the countries had barely developed a range of computers at the level of LEO 1 and
LEO 2 produced in the West in the 50s. Stalin had totally underestimated computers’ potential, and he
allocated only modest research and development funds to the new industry in successive five-year plans
in contrast with the efforts and achievements of the bloc in the space programs in that period. In due
course, the bloc’s weaknesses in computer developments became a major impediment to their space
program, too.
By the time Broido had succeeded in opening the Czechoslovak market with the sale of two large LEO 3
systems (2 x 360, 1 x 326) in the late 60s, several small, early-model Western computers had been
installed in Russia and other COMECON countries. These computers included the early German Zuses,
Elliot Automation 503, 803, and 4100 Series, Ferranti Pegasus and Mercury, PDPs, IBM 1401, and, later,
IBM 360, ICT1300, English Electric, KDP10, KDF8, and KDF6.
It was becoming clear that, under normal conditions, especially given the needs of centrally planned
economies, the demand for computing equipment could, as Broido had foreseen, be considerable.

4
4.1

Particular Features of the Market
Foreign Trade Organizations

In the Soviet Bloc, in sharp contrast to a typically Western market, branches of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade handled all computer purchasing through specialized foreign trade organizations (FTOs). The FTOs
were monopoly buyers, staffed by professionally trained negotiators who usually knew a foreign language
but who had a limited understanding of the products they were responsible for purchasing on behalf of the
ultimate end user.

2

Mark sensing readers were designed to read marks made on documents where the value sensed depended on the position on the
paper of the mark made. For example a salesman would mark the quantity ordered in the appropriate column on a grid printed on
the order form.
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To be successful, we had to become skillful negotiators capable of coping with all the stratagems the
buyers threw at us.

4.2

Permitting Imports of Computers

To manage end users, one had to go through a long and complex process to obtain permission to acquire
an imported computer, which required the permission of their responsible minister, who, in turn, had to
have the approval of a) the State Committee for Science and Technology; b) the Ministry of Finance to
ensure that foreign exchange was allocated for the purchase; c) Gosplan, responsible for the planning of
the Economy and, in particular, the five-year plans; and d) the Security Services to ensure that the
equipment could not be used for non-approved purposes and were installed in a secure environment. At
one time, we counted that one required fifteen signatures to purchase a computer.
A deputy prime minister often had to make the final signature granting the award of a contract to purchase
a computer from the West.

4.3

Negotiating Contracts

The time required from first considering a data-processing project, which required a more powerful
computer than generally available in the Soviet bloc, to specification, the internal selling of the project, the
receiving of the necessary authorization, and the starting of the final negotiations leading to a contract
could be several years. The contract negotiations themselves could be equally protracted. Over this
period, we had little or no contact with the end user. The only real understanding of their requirements
depended on our staff’s experience of applications and our limited knowledge of the FTO negotiators
A typical contact would include detailed schedules of air conditioning equipment, spare parts delivered
with the equipment (generally sufficient to last for three years as our engineers estimated), and provision
of training for the end user staff partly on site or in our training schools set up in the branches but, more
often, in our training facilities in the UK.
One significant business advantage the potential Western vendor had was the knowledge that, once they
had been invited to the FTO to come and negotiate the purchase, the FTO had the necessary authority
and means to pay for the purchase. Another advantage, reflecting the lack of development of commercial
law, was that the Ministry of Foreign Trade was prepared for the contracts to be executed under the
commercial conditions of the supplying countries or, more often, under the commercial laws of selected
countries such as Britain or Sweden.
Nevertheless, the negotiations were always tough and protracted and not necessarily successful. We
sometimes negotiated with the knowledge that a competitor might be negotiating in the room next door.
On one occasion, I was invited to negotiate three separate contracts simultaneously for key ministries
over the Christmas period while knowing that each end user had been allocated currency for the current
year and had to complete the purchase before the year finished. In fact, three FTO teams sitting at
separate tables or sometimes in different rooms called me to negotiate paragraph by paragraph. It was
rather like playing simultaneous chess.

4.4

Surveillance of our staff

The Western computer companies trying to establish themselves in this market had to be aware that they
and their staff were under close surveillance. In practice, this surveillance was a kind of industrial
espionage designed to glean as much knowledge as possible of Western computer technology much in
advance of that available in the Soviet Union at that time. At the same time, we were under strict rules
from COCOM to limit the passing of advanced technological information to the Soviet Bloc.

5
5.1

Developing the Market
Local branches

We recognized quite early that, if we were to become successful long-term suppliers of computer
equipment and systems, we would need to develop a deep understanding of the market and its
requirements, to negotiate clear and comprehensive contracts that could be effectively implemented and
monitored, and to establish a presence in the market by opening branches in each of the counties. Each
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branch would have to have sales, customer support service, engineers, and training staff and, thereby,
learn and understand the requirements of the market, its opportunities, and challenges.
For example, following Broido’s breakthrough success in selling two LEO systems in Czechoslovakia, we
opened Branch offices in the then Czechoslovak cities of Prague, Bratislava, and Brno. To underscore our
determination to stay in each market, we staffed our branches mainly by locally recruited and trained
personnel that U.K. engineers and systems specialists, sometimes expatriates of the country concerned,
supported. However, in Yugoslavia, we used a large local Agency company, Inter-Export, that represented
several important Western businesses. A LEO manager, John Durham, supervised their English Electric
LEO Marconi (EELM) business. Major successes were the sale of large computer systems to the
Yugoslav Army and the BOR copper mining complex.
Over the next few years, we opened similar local branches in all the other Soviet Bloc countries once we
had established a base of sufficient sales and installed computers to justify the cost. By the early
seventies, we had an organization in the Soviet Union, mainly in Moscow, of some 30 staff and their
families. We had set up only the second ever registered British office authorized by the Soviet Union. Our
total number of staff in the bloc numbered some 120 personnel plus their families.
Our situation contrasted with all the other Western computer companies seeking to open and penetrate
this market. They mainly used their German or Austrian offices, situated primarily in Vienna, to send sales
personnel to the Soviet Bloc on an opportunistic basis. IBM, however, set up a headquarters near Vienna
specifically to develop these markets. At its peak, it employed some 2500 people but achieved limited
success.
Because few Western companies operated by opening a branch network, it became essential to establish
ground rules for operating in the bloc. The government tried to control our activities by, for example,
allowing us only to recruit local staff specifically approved by them. Further, we were allocated premises to
use and to accommodate our expatriate staff. This situation turned out to be extremely complicated, timeconsuming, and difficult given the mutual suspicions and restrictions on both sides during the Cold War.

5.2

Building the Team

Because we expected U.K staff to live for several years in a difficult environment, we decided that it would
best to recruit married staff, some with young families, on the basis that a family was likely to be more
stable and, in a way, self-sufficient. The positions were attractive to some of LEO’s more adventurous
staff, mainly men
Few understood the conditions under which they would be working and living in a Communist country at
that time: poor accommodation, hotels that provided strange and inadequate food, limited facilities to allow
them to cook in their rooms, constant KGB surveillance, poor shopping facilities, and little activity for
spouses and families. Health and education services were also not what British individuals were
accustomed, although one of our engineers survived harrowing conditions in a Moscow hospital following
peritonitis. Stress could be considerable: after the UK expelled 105 Soviet from the UK, the children of our
staff attending the school at the British Embassy had to be handed out of the windows to their anxious
parents in the face of hostile crowds outside the school.
Nevertheless, the success of an assignment usually depended on the wife’s ability to live in that
environment. I developed the custom of interviewing the wives to give them a picture of what conditions
for them might be like for them and for the job applicants, who might be enthusiastic about the
opportunities and forget the hardships. In the event, some simply could not find it possible to live under
the restrictions that the system imposed and others perhaps became too close to the Communist regime
and posed potential security risks, but the majority accepted the conditions.
Some of our most successful managers were or became great linguists. Many of them had graduated in
Slav language studies. Sepp Leimgruber and Nick Wynn were each fluent in some twelve languages;
some spoke Russian, and most had some French, German, or Spanish. I decided to acquire a language
laboratory and hire trainers to enable staff going on assignment to have at least a smattering of the
language they required.
Several staff developed interesting and highly successful careers on returning to the UK. John Durham,
Manager of the Yugoslav branch, became a successful software developer and entrepreneur. Alexander
Dembitz, Manager of the Hungarian Branch, set up a company that, in addition to other activities, became
the leading supplier of bank software to international banks. Alec Nacamuli, after his tour of duty in Moscow,
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became the key member of the team that developed the Swift bank fund transfer system. Juergen Kraus,
Manager of the DDR branch, became an effective entrepreneur in Germany. John Bradley, after his period
as the deputy manager of the Moscow branch, became a senior official in the European Commission based
in Brussels. Moshe Peled, who became responsible for our Counter Trade activities, used his counter trade
experience in his subsequent career. Don Riley, a tough New Zealander, was the first manager of our
Moscow branch became after he left LEO, and he became a supplier of computer work stations that
President Gorbachov recognized as an important example of the technology that the Soviet Union lacked.
Subsequently, back in London, he became a successful property owner and by converting old warehouses
into factories. He then founded the brilliant Chocolate Factory heater in Southwark. Roger Landau, who
managed the Polish branch and later the Czechoslovak branch, later married a Czech woman, became an
expert of Indian Culture, and ended up as successful farmer in Britain.

5.3

Networking

As part of the drive to understand the market and become widely known, we networked as extensively as
possible through participating in governmental trade missions, exhibitions, receptions, and Chamber of
Commerce events. We also traveled and visited companies and decision makers. Exhibitions were
sometimes crucially important because officially sponsored exhibitions were frequently provided with
funds to purchase the exhibited goods. These became major efforts. For the first large computer exhibition
INCOMEX in 1966 in Prague, we sent over 100 of our staff to cover the six weeks of the exhibition to
demonstrate our serious intent following Broido’s first successes there.

5.4

Counter Trade

As a consequence of the trade policies seeking self-sufficiency in the Soviet bloc, the region experienced
a perpetual shortage of convertible foreign exchange. It soon became clear that, if we were to grow the
market significantly, we would need to participate in a form of exchange called “counter trade” (Stevens,
1995). Counter trade is a form of business derived from the more primitive trade known as “barter”.
Counter trade is a form of business that enables importers short of convertible currency to purchase goods
and services they needed by offering, instead of payment, goods and services in exchange. These were
frequently in surplus or difficult to sell through normal channels. Although an inefficient method of conducting
international trade, counter trade created possibilities of business that were otherwise impossible.
We were under continuous pressure to buy a range of exotic products, such as trained falcons or racing
camels (to resell to rich Middle East princes), various horns to grind up into medicines, and a wide variety
of handicrafts, all of which we tried to avoid. We did try to import miniature electric motors, which turned
out to be unreliable. Specialist companies in counter trade offered to take these types of products but at
unreasonable prices.
We persisted and set up our own counter trade department to avoid loss and limit the risk of trading by
only buying what we knew we could sell on. We succeeded, for example, by identifying a small Bulgarian
vineyard making a good quality red wine, which we were able to sell to social clubs and for events at
home. We purchased large quantities of ball bearings from Romania for the British motorcar industry.
Through the ingenuity of Moshe Peled, we helped to ensure the production of a successful film at the
famous Czech film studios at Barandov near Prague to supply a large system 4 installation to the regional
government authority of Prague. Hungary was able to produce computer cabinets to our specification. We
purchased hanging baskets in Bulgaria for flower arrangements, which we sold to garden centers and
even municipalities. When electric and electronic typewriters displaced manual typewriters, we found a
ready market for small manual machines made in East Germany and Bulgaria.

5.5

Co-operation

We always faced further pressure to help the Soviet Union and its satellites to reduce the technological gap
between them and the West. We were willing to be supportive provided that the assistance was in COCOM
rules and that we would not provide any form of potential help to their military capacity (especially during the
Cold War). Problems arose over technologies that were essentially civilian but had a possible military use. I
negotiated frequently with a company lawyer in attendance to help with any legal issues.
We modified a System 4 computer that that fell completely in the technical parameters defined by the
COCOM regulations and offered it for sale but (not surprisingly) without much success. On the other hand,
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As I mention in Section 1, in the early days of the computer industry, Russian research and thinking about
computer concepts was reasonably advanced and sometimes ahead of the West (Hally, 2003). Russia
produced early computers with similar computing power as LEO 1in significant numbers, but these
systems almost totally lacked efficient peripherals.
For a considerable time, Russia had rudimentary designs and manufacturing capabilities for reliable
storage (e.g., chip-based storage) and printers, magnetic tape, and drums. This situation occurred largely
due to Stalin’s poor understanding of computers’ potential: he did not allocate enough resources to the
industry and research. In due course, under the leadership of the State Committee for Science and
Technology and the Academy of Sciences, the problem was recognized, and the USSR Government
began to realize the urgent need to catch up with the West.
Although there was a strongly argued opinion that the Soviet Union needed, for security and economic
reasons, to become self-sufficient in information technology, a decision was taken against strong pressure
from hard-liners to acquire already developed technology from the West, (Malinovski, 2006; Graham,
1998). At this point, the offer of co-operation by LEO, and later by ICL, to provide some technology and
assembly rights became attractive to influential members of the decision making bodies and in particular
to Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, Rakovski and Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and
Technolgy, Gvishiani. However, by then, the overwhelming dominance of the IBM 360 series in the West
became the target for the Soviet Bloc and led to the defeat of the self-sufficiency group and those wanting
to work with LEO/ICL.
Accordingly, the bloc developed a new plan, which would allocate all members of the Warsaw Pact with
specific areas for developing the industry. The primary task (allocated to the Soviet Union) was to develop
powerful computers to rival the systems of CDC and IBM. Key roles for a range of computers and
peripherals were allocated to the DDR (East Germany) with major plants in Dresden and also, perhaps more
surprisingly, to Bulgaria (mainly in Plovdiv) for smaller computers, disk systems, and electronic typewriters.
The bloc implemented the new plan by smuggling several IBM 360 systems via the German Democratic
Republic (Deutche Demokratiche Republic) to Russia, Bulgaria, and elsewhere. The countries emulated
the hardware reasonably effectively but slowly by reverse engineering, although poor manufacturing
techniques and high fault rates impeded success. In the meantime, the attempts to emulate the software,
systems, languages, and applications proved to be much more difficult than expected, which led to long
delays in the project implementation.

6

Conclusion

Despite IBM’s prestige and marketing strength and partly because of the United States’ Cold War attitude,
we became a major supplier of computing equipment from the West to the Soviet Union and its satellites
from 1970 to 1990. I believe we did so primarily because we understood the vagaries and needs of this
particular market. Our computers were installed in the key branches of government and industry
throughout Eastern Europe, and the area became a profitable market for LEO, EELM, and ICL.
It has sometimes occurred to me that if, during the Cold War, as result of incipient conflict, we had
stopped supplying spare parts for our installed computers, we would have caused chaos in the centrally
planned economies of the Soviet Bloc.
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